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THE STRANGE CAREER OF PRIVATE TAKINGS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE USE

JAN G. LAITOS*
Throughout the Intermountain West, an interesting and disconcerting trend is occurring in resort communities that are also world-class
skiing meccas, such as Breckenridge, Aspen, Telluride in Colorado
or Summit County in Utah. Wealthy second-home buyers, dubbed
“amenity migrants,” have driven up prices so much in these communities that virtually no one else can afford to either buy or rent
homes there. Those who actually work in these resort communities—
the police, firefighters, cooks, ski-lift operators, waitstaff and housekeepers—cannot afford to live there and instead must commute from
more affordable locations, often hours away.1
In order to provide close-in housing for those who actually work
in these communities, many of the resort areas have contemplated
ways of providing affordable “workforce housing.” Some local governments have adopted inclusionary housing ordinances, which require
developers to make affordable a certain portion of new development.
Other local governments have town or city housing authorities build
their own affordable housing.2 But would it be possible for state legislatures in states experiencing the amenity migrant phenomenon
to instead delegate to a private housing developer the power to exercise eminent domain? Would a private developer constitutionally
be able to condemn private land for the purpose of building private
workforce housing? Would not such a delegation to a private party
be contrary to the essential law of eminent domain, which seems
to require that (1) only the sovereign—only a government—exercise
that power,3 and (2) private property may not be taken from one
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Professor of Law and John A. Carver, Jr.
Chair in Natural Resources and Environmental Law.
1. Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Problem of Amenity Migrants in North America
and Europe, 45 URB. LAW . 849 (2013).
2. Jonathan Thompson, When Living Where You Work Is out of Reach, THE DENVER POST
(May 23, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/perspective/ci_28170119.
3. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in relevant part, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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private party for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party?4
With respect to the first question, state constitutions and legislative
enactments in the Intermountain West have traditionally granted
authority to private parties to exercise the power of eminent domain.
This broad power has been delegated either to promote private development and use of coal, oil, gas, timber, water, and other natural
resources5 or to acquire land so private entities, as “common carriers,”
could build private pipelines, transmission lines, or railroads.6 With
respect to the second question, the United States Supreme Court has
decided in several cases that if eminent domain has been exercised
to take private property for the public purpose of private economic
development, then the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment is satisfied.7 The transfer of property from one private party to
another is constitutionally acceptable—even if the property will not
be put into use by the public—if the transfer is for a “public purpose,”
such as promoting a community’s economy.8
When a state or local government initiates eminent domain to
take from A to give to B in order to support an area’s economic growth,
the public is implicated in this transaction because a government
body is behind the condemnation.9 But when a private natural resources company, or a private common carrier, has the power to take
Although this Takings Clause is written in the passive voice, it is generally understood that
it was added to the Bill of Rights to impose a federal constitutional limit on the new federal
government’s exercise of eminent domain.
4. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
5. Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON . HISTORY 232, 244–45 (1973); Alexandra B.
Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO . L. REV. 651 (2008). Several states in the
West have constitutions that permit private takings for private use in order to ensure that
private parcels surrounded by other land are not landlocked and to allow diversion canals and
ditches to be constructed across private land to perfect a water appropriation. See, e.g., COLO .
CONST., Art. II, § 14.
6. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN , NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.05[3][a] (3d ed. 2007).
7. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
8. Id. at 479, 484.
9. Robert Dreher & John Echeverria, Kelo’s Unanswered Questions: The Policy Debate
over the Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y
INST. REPORT (2006), http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/GELPIReport
_Kelo.pdf; Klass, supra note 5, at 653.
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property from a private party in order to secure a private economic
gain, then the exercise of eminent domain power has become a “private taking of private property for private use.” What follows below
is a discussion and critique of this little-known, but commonly accepted, class of private taking.
Part I summarizes the two private entities that traditionally have
been conferred the power to take private property for their own private use: (1) natural resource developers and (2) common carriers
involved in, and responsible for, our country’s transportation, storage,
and distribution (TS&D) system for energy infrastructure—pipelines,
electrical transmission lines, and rail lines. Part II considers the traditional rationale for those private takings, which typically relies on
some version of the notion that the public at large may, or will, eventually benefit from this private exercise of eminent domain. Part III
explores the four central problems associated with these kinds of
private takings: (1) the potential for inefficiencies and abuses when
state laws distrust normal private market allocations of resources
and instead rely on private party condemnation decisions to create
a public benefit; (2) the typical absence of meaningful judicial review;
(3) the failure to take into account countervailing interests when authorizing private parties to determine the best use of another’s private property; and (4) the inability of traditional calculations of “just
compensation” to truly compensate a private party whose property
has been taken by another private party. Part IV offers suggestions
on how to reform this particular class of private takings.
I. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTABLE PRIVATE TAKINGS
In two settings, the significant power of eminent domain is used
as a tool by private industry to promote private interests by taking
land and property from other private parties—(1) when state constitutions and statutes give condemnation power to private natural
resource developers, and (2) when statutes grant condemnation authority to so-called “common carriers,” such as private power companies, pipelines, or railroads. In the former case, the private taking
may at best produce a public use by contributing to the growth of the
larger community economy. In the latter case, for common carriers
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such as power utilities or railroads, the eventual transmission line
or railroad freight car will eventually be for “use by the public,” and
should in theory provide services to the entire community. Also,
common carriers are often subject to rate regulation by a public
utility commission.10
Historically, it was quite common for states in the Intermountain
West to have both state constitutions and statutory enactments that
gave broad authority to private developers of natural resources to
exercise the power of eminent domain to promote use of coal, oil, gas,
hard rock mining, timber, and water. These provisions permitted private resource companies to file condemnation actions in state court
to take existing private property in order to extract valuable mineral
wealth; to produce energy from coal, oil, or gas; to engage in timber
harvesting; and to build irrigation ditches to appropriate water. Some
western states, such as Wyoming, grounded the right to condemn in
the state constitution, in which case the private condemnor was not
even required to show “public interest or necessity” when there was
a private condemnation.11 This extraordinary use of the eminent domain power for immediate private use was justified as a way for
these states to develop their economies, which were, in the West,
built largely on natural resources.12
The other way for private parties to exercise eminent domain is
when a private entity is deemed a common carrier by state law. The
condemnation rights of certain common carriers, such as petroleum
pipeline companies, may be even greater than those of the gas and
electric utilities, which are subject to regulation by the Public Service
Commission.13 To become a common carrier, a private company must
show that it will deploy the eminent domain power and then use the

10. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1884 (2007).
11. ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION 67 (1993);
Matt Micheli & Mike Smith, The More Things Change, the More Things Stay the Same: A Practitioner’s Guide to Recent Changes to Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act, 8 WYO . L. REV. 1 (2008).
12. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW : PRIVATE RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE 583 (West 2007); Klass, supra note 5, at 661.
13. Julie A. Beberman, Exercise of Power of Eminent Domain for Special Purposes: Provide
Restrictions on Use of Eminent Domain Power by Petroleum Pipeline Companies, 12 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 184, 186 (1995).
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“taken” private land for a public use or public purpose.14 In many
states, common carrier status is conferred on pipeline companies,
transmission lines, and railroads if the condemnation serves the
“public interest and necessity.”15 States vary with respect to whether
the common carrier seeking to condemn has the burden of demonstrating need and public use16 or whether it is legislatively presumed that the exercise of eminent domain automatically serves the
public interest.17
Pipelines are a particularly common and powerful type of common
carrier that exercise eminent domain. This eminent domain power
permits the private pipeline company to condemn land, rights-of-way,
easements, and virtually any property from private parties.18 Natural
gas companies may also obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity under the federal Natural Gas Act and thereby acquire private rights of eminent domain pursuant to that federal certificate.19
II. HOW CAN A PRIVATE TAKING BECOME A “PUBLIC USE”?
The text of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution seems to declare that governments, particularly the federal
14. Cyrus Zarraby, Regulating Carbon Capture and Sequestration: A Federal Regulatory
Regime to Promote the Construction of a National Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Network, 80 GEO .
WASH . L. REV. 950, 967 (2012); Holly Bannerman, Fracking, Eminent Domain, and the Need
for Legal Reform in North Carolina: The Gap Left by the Clean Energy and Economic Security
Act, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH . ONLINE 35, 55 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 118 P. 3d 996, 1014
(Wyo. 2005).
16. Brandon Gerstle, Giving Landowners the Power: A Democratic Approach for Assembling Transmission Corridors, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG . 535, 544 (2014); Gregory S. Ramirez,
Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC: A Probability of
Future Use by the Public as a Key to Exercising Eminent Domain, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89,
92 (2012).
17. Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 4; John Allen Chalk, Sr. & Sadie Harrison-Fincher,
Eminent Domain Power Granted to Private Pipeline Companies Meets with Greater Resistance
from Property Owners in Urban Rather than Rural Areas, 16 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 17,
18 (2009).
18. Laura A. Hanley, Judicial Battles Between Pipeline Companies and Landowners: It’s
Not Necessarily Who Wins, but by How Much, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 125, 136 (2000); Amanda Niles,
Eminent Domain and Pipeline in Texas: It’s as Easy as 1, 2, 3—Common Carriers, Gas Utilities, and Gas Corporations, 16 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 271, 280–81 (2010).
19. Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by Private
Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural Gas Act and the
Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L. J. 499, 501–07 (2006).
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government, may “take” private property so long as two conditions
are met. First, the taking must be for a public use, and second, just
compensation must be paid to the private property owner for the
property that has been taken.20 Most state constitutions contain a
similar requirement that the taking be for a public use.21 The question that arises is how this exacting constitutional standard for a
public use is satisfied when the taking by a private entity seems to
be for a private party, either a private natural resource developer or
a private common carrier.
A. Public Use Satisfied When the Taking Is by a Private Resource
Developer or Energy Company
In the nineteenth century, legislatures in Midwestern and Intermountain West states delegated eminent domain authority to private
resource developers, energy providers, and transportation companies
in order to help these states create their economies.22 Since private
economic development was seen as the primary driver of community
or statewide economic growth, private company use of eminent domain power for resource, energy, or transportation development
was thought to bring about a larger public benefit rather than a private purpose.23 When these delegations of eminent domain power to
private parties were challenged in court, they were upheld on the
grounds that since the needs of communities were furthered by economic growth, private company takings that furthered economic expansion were for a public goal and therefore a public use.24
Several other rationales have been used to convert what appears
to be private takings of private property for private benefit into private takings of private property that work, in effect, as a public use.
20. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I (Bill of Rights), § II: “No private property shall be . . . taken
for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.” Compare COLO . CONST., art. II
(Bill of Rights), § 15: “private property shall not be taken . . . for public or private use, without
just compensation.”
22. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 259–62
(1977); Klass, supra note 5, at 655, 657.
23. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Klass, supra note 5, at 675.
24. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (Idaho 1906); Hand Gold Mining Co. v.
Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877).
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In the case of a power line constructed to serve a private company,
the private power company’s exercise of eminent domain has been
justified as a public use because other members of the public would
have the same right to use the new line as the private company.25
Some state legislatures have permitted private entities to exercise
eminent domain authority for either the “public use” or the much
broader “public benefit.”26 Private takings which result in some general benefit or advantage to the public then may satisfy the public
use requirement. But the most important development involving public use has been the gradual judicial acceptance of the broad definition of the phrase that encompasses public advantage, public utility,
or general (and often amorphous) “public purpose.” The United States
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London27 signaled that the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement was largely
coterminous with public purpose even when eminent domain ultimately benefits private entities.28
B. Public Use Satisfied When Private Condemnor Is a
Common Carrier
It has long been assumed that the nation’s important TS&D system
for energy infrastructure—pipelines, power lines, and railroad lines—
would require private energy service providers to exercise eminent
domain. Indeed, as hydrofracturing increases domestic oil and gas
supplies and makes the United States more energy independent,
demand is growing for transportation, storage, and distribution systems; pipelines, power lines, and rail lines are needed to move, store,
and deliver both clean energy fuel (e.g., oil and gas) and electricity
from even cleaner energy sources (e.g., from wind, solar, and hydro).29
25. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1989); Montana Power Co. v. Bokma,
457 P.2d 769 (Mont. 1969).
26. See Bannerman, supra note 14, at 54–56.
27. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
28. See, e.g., id. at 479–80; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Rob Garver, Review Finds US Energy Infrastructure in Desperate Shape, FISCAL TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/review-finds-us-energy-infrastruc
ture-in-desperate-shape/ar-AAbsrsE; Jeremy Miller, Trains Carrying Oil Raise Tough Questions
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The private companies that typically provide these TS&D services,
especially for energy infrastructure, are often conferred special status by state law—the status of being a common carrier.
When a private entity is designated as a common carrier, it may
enter on and condemn the land, rights-of-way, easements and property
of private parties.30 A private company, such as a pipeline company
or a company that owns a power line, may become a common carrier
if it qualifies under various conditions set forth in state law.31 Often,
state law establishes that the private common carrier is authorized
to condemn property but only if the condemnation either serves “the
public interest and necessity”32 or if the taking is for a public use.33
In states where common carriers can exercise eminent domain
when the condemnation serves the public interest and necessity,
the private condemnor need only show a reasonable necessity for the
project, which often means “reasonably convenient or useful to the
public.”34 In other states, the common carrier’s decision that a public
need exists is conclusive and not subject to review.35 More commonly,
statutes across America granting condemnation power to common
carriers presume that the project that is the reason for the exercise
of eminent domain will be destined for eventual use by the public,
thereby satisfying the public use requirement.36 Or, states may convey eminent domain authority to private common carriers by simply
statutorily defining pipelines, transmission lines, and rail lines as
a public use under state law.37 In all of these states, public use does
in Northwest, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2014, at 5, available at http://www.hcn.org/is
sues/46.20/trains-carrying-oil-raise-tough-questions-in-pacific-northwest.
30. Hanley, supra note 18, at 134–36; TEXAS NAT . RES. CODE ANN . § 111.019 (granting
common carriers the right of eminent domain).
31. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN . § 111.002 (“a person is a common carrier if it . . .
owns or manages a pipeline for the transportation of crude petroleum”).
32. See, e.g., WYO . STAT. ANN . § 1-26-801-815.
33. Daniel B. Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in
Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (1966).
34. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cnty. v. Atter, 734 P. 2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1987).
35. Saunders v. Titus Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.
App. 1993); but see Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 363 S.W.3d 192
(Tex. 2012) (merely registering as a common carrier does not bar property owners contesting
in court whether a planned exercise of eminent domain meets statutory requirements for a
common carrier).
36. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Klass, supra note 5, at 659.
37. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 983 (2015).
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not mean that the public must have the right to actually use the
property that is taken.38
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVATE TAKINGS
The legitimacy of private takings was threatened in the wake of
the Kelo case, when nearly half of the states adopted statutory or
constitutional restrictions on the use of eminent domain to transfer
land to private developers.39 Although much of this post-Kelo legislation was “largely symbolic in nature,”40 what was perhaps most notable about this flurry of legislation is that it did not put restrictions
on the private exercise of eminent domain authority for private projects associated with electric transmission lines, oil and gas pipelines,
and the development of natural resources.41 Nor did any of this postKelo legislation alter the states’ tradition of giving eminent domain
power to private entities deemed to be common carriers.42 The power
of private entities to exercise the power of eminent domain for private ends is still largely intact. What problems arise when eminent
domain is used by private parties to reallocate private property?
A. Inefficiencies and the Potential for Abuse
A truly private taking—when a private party “takes” the private
property of another for some private use that theoretically has some
public purpose—is an acknowledgment by the state that is authorizing the taking that the private party vested with eminent domain authority is better able than the original owner to decide the use of the
land being taken. The state has in effect preferred A’s use of the land
(where A is granted eminent domain) over B’s use, where B is the
owner of the land being taken by A. The state’s distrust of the private
market as an allocative mechanism may be warranted when there
38. Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So.3d 192, 198–99 (La. 2010).
39. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 579 (18th ed. Foundation Press 2013).
40. Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative
and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 708 (2011).
41. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1094 (2013);
Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 4–5.
42. Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 37, at 983–84.
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is market failure or private holdouts preventing coherent, benign
development patterns.43 On the other hand, expropriating property
from “unoffending” private owners and transferring their land to
more “favored” developers (i.e., those authorized to exercise eminent
domain) has been likened by some commentators as a form of “reverse
Robin Hoodery.”44
Indeed, in many ways a private taking has all the characteristics
of a classic lose-lose situation. From the perspective of A, the private
party conferred the power of eminent domain, the projected public
benefits may be speculative and subject to unfounded exaggeration
compared to the magnitude of purely private benefits enjoyed by A.45
From the perspective of B, the private party whose land is taken,
there follows a loss of individual autonomy that results when there
is unwilling property dispossession.46 And there is always the risk
that those dispossessed by eminent domain will be unfairly undercompensated for their loss.
If state agencies overseeing the private takings are deferential,
and if there is little effective judicial review, then the rationale for
private takings—to achieve some larger public purpose—may be seriously undermined.47 It is difficult to determine whether a transfer
from A to B is more private than public.48 Nor does a public purpose
test give guidance on how much “public” is necessary for a purely
private transfer of private property to become a public use. Moreover,
state laws authorizing private takings do not necessarily require a
plan as a precondition to A taking B’s property; nor do these laws
usually explicitly require of A, or impose an obligation on A, to accomplish some specific social welfare goal.49 As a result, a private
43. George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do with It?,
17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803, 805 (2008).
44. Gideon Kanner, We Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning—Sorry About That,
Justice Stevens, 39 URB. LAW . 529, 531 (2007).
45. Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and
Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON . REV. 173, 183 (2009).
46. Jeffrey Kleeger, Kelo’s Influence on Keystone Pipeline Asks “Where’s the Public Purpose?”,
44 URB. LAW . 719, 720 (2012).
47. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005) (private economic development
is a public use because it should, or may, bring about the legitimate public purpose of economic growth).
48. Lefcoe, supra note 43, at 851.
49. Kleeger, supra note 46, at 721–23.
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taking not only legitimizes private expropriation of private property,
it also may cloak ulterior motives such as rent-seeking.50
B. The Absence of Meaningful Judicial Review
When state legislatures and constitutions delegate eminent domain
authority to private natural resource development interests, or private energy TS&D entities, the operating premise for this extraordinary grant of condemnation power is that the private party granted
the power will exercise it for a public use. If an owner’s property was
being taken by another private party pursuant to these state laws,
the challenge was usually based on the claim that the property taken
would not in fact be for a public use but rather for a private gain. However, reviewing courts rarely disturbed the private taking on those
grounds. These courts developed several theories that permitted them
to defer to the private taking and to conclude that the taking was
indeed for a public use.
For transmission lines and pipelines, where after the eminent
domain power had been exercised property ownership would reside
in a private party, courts still could find a public use if the public had
the ability to use the private electrical lines or gas/oil that flowed in
the private pipeline.51 Many state courts broadened the “public use”
definition to require only that the taking yield some public benefit or
advantage, a view which equated public use with “public interest” or
even “public purpose.”52 The United States Supreme Court eventually
adopted a construction of public use that defined the phrase as furthering public advantage or public utility.53 The Kelo case rejected
an interpretation of public use that meant the property would actually be used by the public.54 Kelo held that public use was coterminous with public purpose, where courts should defer to legislative
determinations as to what constituted a public purpose.55
50. Kelly, supra note 45, at 176.
51. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 318–19 (Colo. 1989); Montana Power Co. v.
Bokma, 457 P.2d 769, 772–73 (Mont. 1969).
52. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 196 (2002).
53. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
54. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005).
55. Id. at 488–89; City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1132–33 (Ohio 2006).
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Lack of meaningful judicial review means that states are defaulting
to those private parties that have been delegated the eminent domain power. One court found that a pipeline company’s decision that
a public need existed is conclusive and not subject to review.56 A state
legislator concluded that a petroleum pipeline company enjoyed an
“unfettered” power of eminent domain.57 When private parties not
only have eminent domain power but the ability to wield this power
without a meaningful judicial check, the potential exists for private
takings to have far more private than public benefit.
When statutes confer common carrier status on private parties,
courts are even more deferential when it comes to these parties exercising eminent domain. Challenges based on a taking being for an
unconstitutional “private” use are typically rejected when a common
carrier is doing the taking.58 Commentators have concluded that the
standard for courts to overturn a company’s designation as a common
carrier exercising eminent domain is “almost insurmountable and
essentially unreviewable.”59 A similar, largely unreviewable situation
arises when a gas utility or gas pipeline exercises eminent domain
in states whose legislatures grant the power of condemnation to private gas TS&D companies.60
C. Failure to Broaden the Limited Scope of Public Use
One persistent issue with private entities deploying eminent
domain is a stubborn insistence on the part of courts to assume that
public use and public purpose may be satisfied only if narrowly defined
economic benefits might result. Courts reviewing private takings have
been content to sustain private exercises of eminent domain as constitutional public uses so long as the public experiences some plausible
56. Saunders v. Titus Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.
App. 1993).
57. Lawmakers ’95 (GPTV broadcast, Jan. 24, 1995) (remarks by Senator Hooks, Senate
Dist. No. 14, cosponsor of SB 24).
58. Linder v. Ark. Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 362 S.W.3d 889 (Ark. 2010); Smith v.
Ark. Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 377 S.W.3d 199 (Ark. 2010). See also MONT. CODE ANN .
§§ 70-30-103; 69-13-104.
59. Niles, supra note 18, at 292.
60. Thatcher v. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co., 180 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1950); Valero
Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 990 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. App. 1999); id. at 284–85.
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traditional economic gain. Courts will rarely, if ever, consider whether
any countervailing non-traditional economic benefits, or the achievement of non-economic values, might be a better “use” of the power
of eminent domain.61
Prior to the Kelo case, the United States Supreme Court had decided only two public use cases in the previous forty years—Berman
v. Parker (1954)62 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984).63
Berman upheld as a public use the taking of private property for the
purpose of redeveloping blighted urban neighborhoods, and Midkiff
sustained the use of eminent domain to solve the problem of concentrated land ownership. Both cases rejected the argument that private
property taken outright by eminent domain is a private purpose when
the property is transferred to private beneficiaries. Rather, since
urban blight (Berman) and land oligopoly (Midkiff ) were economic
problems involving land ownership in the land market, it would be
a legitimate public use for eminent domain to be exercised to solve
these economic problems.
The Kelo case built upon the Berman-Midkiff rule by declaring that
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
function of government.”64 Indeed, Kelo explicitly recognized that
economic development takings were a traditional and acceptable
public use, as were private takings related to natural resources and
energy development.65 But Kelo did not discuss or consider whether
there might be other economic drivers besides the extraction of natural resources, the development of energy resources, or the removal
of urban blight and excessive concentrated land ownership.
By the twenty-first century, land development other than natural
resources and mineral development, and land uses quite different
than urban renewal and the construction of shopping malls, are increasingly important to the economies of states and local communities.
Particularly in the Intermountain West, recreation, tourism, hunting,

61. Klass, supra note 5, at 666.
62. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
63. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
64. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
65. Id. (Kelo acknowledged the “importance of [natural resources] industries to the [economic
welfare of the states] . . . .”).
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and fishing have become the foundations for the economy.66 In these
states, the best public use of private property targeted for a private
taking might not be for natural resource extraction or for urban renewal but instead for uses involving recreation or tourism.67 However, these more modern uses of natural resources have historically
not yet been granted “public use” designation by legislatures or courts.
A public use typically requires there to be a traditional land transfer
from one private party to another private party who will mine or reconfigure the land for standard economic growth purposes.68
The public use designation required for acceptable private takings
is almost always locked into some type of economic use or benefit. In
other words, acceptable public uses have entailed that the private
condemnor not only “take” the private property of another but also
use that property somehow for some economic purpose enjoyed by the
public. However, there is another value inherent in land and property that should be able to compete with private land transfers that
only entail use. And that is the value that follows when land and
property are preserved and not used. Eminent domain use should be
able to be exercised by private parties where the end use is, in fact,
no use. Open space, wilderness, and land trusts for preservationist
non-use purposes should be considered as a countervailing, equally
valuable public use.69
D. An Unjust Measure of Just Compensation
When private takings occur, it is generally a formidable uphill
battle for the party whose property is being taken to argue that the
private party doing the taking will violate the constitutional public
use requirement. As noted above, most state courts have concluded
that natural resource-related takings benefit the public, and state

66. See generally THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N. BARRETT, POST-COWBOY ECO PROSPERITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN WEST (2001).
67. Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural Resources, 34 ENVTL.
L. 1091 (2004); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140 (1999).
68. Klass, supra note 5, at 677–80.
69. Jan G. Laitos & Catherine M. H. Keske, The Right of Nonuse, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG .
303 (2010); see generally JAN G. LAITOS, THE RIGHT OF NONUSE (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
NOMICS: PAY AND
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statutes and constitutions often expressly provide that private TS&D
entities exercising eminent domain for energy infrastructure are a
per se public use. The only remaining argument then is that the landowner may not be receiving a fair measure of constitutionally required “just compensation.”
Although the definition of just compensation varies between
states,70 most courts generally rely on the property’s “fair market
value” to determine the actual calculation of what is just.71 This fair
market value standard is intended to replicate the price that would
otherwise be reached in a normal arm’s-length market transaction
between a willing, but unobligated, buyer and seller.72 Two common
considerations, or formulae, are used when deriving fair market value
in condemnation situations. “Highest and best use” not only considers
the property’s value in its present use but also its value in a reasonably probable use that results in the highest economic value.73 The
“before and after” test is used when the condemning party, such as
a TS&D energy company building a pipeline, takes only a portion of
the landowner’s parcel. This test ascertains the difference between
the fair market value of the entire parcel and the fair market value
of what remains after the condemnation.74
Increasingly, scholars and commentators have criticized these
taking valuations, especially when the taking is a private taking.75
The concern is that the standard just compensation model tends to
undercompensate landowners.76 There are several reasons why the
use of fair market value results in an undue share of condemnation
costs borne by the landowner whose property is being taken by another private party. Perhaps the most important failure of the fair
70. JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS, Ch. 17 (Aspen 2014).
71. Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation”, 21 STAN . L.
REV. 693, 696 (1969).
72. Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 3876 (2d Cir. 2006).
73. Baston v. Cnty. of Kenton ex rel Kenton Cnty. Airport Bd., 319 S.W.3d 401, 406
(Ky. 2010).
74. Hanley, supra note 18, at 160.
75. Kelianne Chamberlain, Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based Approach
to Pipeline Takings, 14 WYO . L. REV. 77, 87–90 (2014); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight:
Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 767 (1973).
76. Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent
Domain, 113 COLUM . L. REV. 593 (2013); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1479–80 (2008).
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market value test is that it denies compensation for what has been
termed “real but subjective values.”77 One must remember that the
owner of property in a private taking has not voluntarily chosen to
sell it to the private party taking it. It follows then that the landowner values the land at a price higher than its fair market value,
because otherwise the owner would have accepted this market price
and sold the land.78
There are two other reasons why the standard just compensation
model tends to undercompensate landowners experiencing a private
taking. First, most states do not permit the value of the project for
which the property is being taken (e.g., a pipeline, or transmission
line) to affect the fair market value of the property.79 If the land after
the private taking will enhance the value, that positive change in
value cannot be included in the just compensation calculation.80 Second, fair market value usually fails to consider what have been termed
“dignitary harms,” which is the perception of being unfairly targeted
for condemnation.81 Such resentment can be very real, especially if,
as noted in Part III.A above, the private taking becomes a form of
“reverse Robin Hoodery” where politically powerful private parties
can condemn private land regardless of the landowner’s wishes.82
IV. AN AGENDA FOR REFORMING PRIVATE TAKINGS
In light of the many issues and problems that have arisen due
to private takings of private property, it would seem that states
should consider how they might change the laws that presently allow
77. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN , TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
183 (1985); Yun-Chien Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings
Compensation Is Efficient?, 20 SUP. CT. ECON . REV. 35, 36–37 (2012).
78. THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN : PRIVATE PROPERTY,
PUBLIC USE 153 (2011), Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 94–95; Gerstle, supra note 16, at 541
(“the just compensation model tends to undercompensate landowners because it ignores individuals’ anthropocentric valuation”).
79. State Dept. of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1003 (Colo. 1994).
80. Matthew C. Williams, Restitution, Eminent Domain, and Economic Development:
Moving to a Gains-Based Conception of the Takings Clause, 41 URB. LAW . 183, 190 (2009).
81. Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 95.
82. See Kanner, supra note 44; Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain
and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD . 13, 721–22 (2008).
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a private party to condemn private land for private gain. Any such
“reform” legislation should track the deficiencies in current “economic
development takings law” that have been summarized in Part III
above. Three structural changes seem necessary: (1) improved procedures to govern interactions between the private party exercising
eminent domain and the party whose land is being taken; (2) meaningful judicial review; and (3) adequate and realistic just compensation.
A. Procedural Reforms
New and more informative protocols should be established between
condemning parties and landowners. Initially, companies and entities
should notify landowners of their rights prior to initiating the eminent
domain process.83 This type of provision could protect landowners who
may not have any knowledge of their legal rights prior to or during
the condemnation process.84 These legal rights derive from both constitutional and statutory law.
Next, the condemnor should be expected to make reasonable efforts
to acquire the property by purchasing it after good faith negotiation.
This negotiation should entail at least one bona fide offer by the condemning authority. A bona fide offer requirement shifts some of the
power away from the condemning authority and towards the landowner.85 Some states, like Texas, require the condemnor to make at
least two separate offers before resorting to eminent domain.86
But the most important procedural change would be some constitutional or statutory obligation to create an administrative record
that allows for meaningful judicial review of whether the private taking is really for a public use. This “record” should entail a written account of a process—a public process—where the merits of the taking
have been considered and perhaps even debated.87 The condemnor

83. Beberman, supra note 13, at 192–94.
84. Malcolm Means, Private Pipeline, Public Use?: Linder v. Arkansas Midstream Gas
Services Corp., Smith v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Services Corp., and Arkansas’s Eminent
Domain Jurisprudence, 64 ARK . L. REV. 809, 835–37 (2011).
85. Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 8–9.
86. Compare State v. Dowd, 867 S.W.2d 781 (Texas 1993) (only one offer needed), with
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN . § 21.0113 (b)(1)–(2) (two written offers needed).
87. Klass, supra note 5, at 695.
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should have the burden of making a case to some administrative
body that the private taking will result in a truly public use. The
individual landowners affected, along with other environmental or
public interests, should be afforded the opportunity to argue that
the taking will be for some private benefit. If the relevant administrative authority concurs that the taking, albeit by a private party,
is for public use, that determination can be the basis for some future
judicial appeal.
The Texas Supreme Court has seemed to acknowledge the need
to affirmatively demonstrate the presence of a public use when there
are private takings by common carriers and other TS&D entities. In
Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas (2012),88
the Court found that “[m]erely registering as a common carrier does
not . . . ban [landowners] from contesting in court whether a planned
pipeline meets the statutory requirements [for a public use]. Nothing . . . leaves landowners so vulnerable to unconstitutional private
takings.”89 The Court thereby rejected the otherwise irrefutable presumption that simply proclaiming that one is a common carrier is
sufficient to confer the power of eminent domain.90
While the Denbury case is limited to Texas law and common carriers there, some of its central holdings have instructive potential
regarding other examples of private takings elsewhere. First, the
private condemnor should have to demonstrate a reasonable probability that members of the public other than the condemnor (or its
customers) would experience some benefit after the private exercise
of eminent domain.91 Second, there is no presumption that the private
taking will yield a public use; the burden of demonstrating public
use is on the private entity seeking to use eminent domain.92 These
two changes help level the playing field between the private condemnor and the landowner.
88. 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
89. Id. at 195.
90. Megan James, Checking the Box Is Not Enough: The Impact of Texas Rice Land Partners,
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC and Texas’s Eminent Domain Reforms on the
Common Carrier Application Process, 45 TEX. TECH . L. REV. 959, 987–89 (2013); John Gray,
The Door Opens to Challenge Some Pipeline Claims of Eminent Domain, 50 HOUSTON LAW .
43 (2012).
91. Ramirez, supra note 16, at 90–92.
92. 362 S.W.3d at 202 (mere fiats by the Legislature do not make a private use a public one).
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B. The Opportunity for Meaningful Judicial Review
As noted above in Part III, the absence of “meaningful” judicial
review is one of the primary reasons private takings have been so
dominated by the private condemnor, whose power to assume ownership of private property has seemed limitless. The reason why this
power has been exercised so brutally is because there has been no
effective check on whether the condemnation has been for a truly
public use or whether the condemnation’s end use is preferable to
other competing uses of the land. The former issue goes to the question of whether the taking yields a private or public benefit. The latter issue assumes that some public benefit will ensue but asks
whether the taken land might be put to some better public use.
The most frequently debated and litigated question addresses
whether the private taking of private land will actually result in some
larger public good instead of simply enhancing the economic wealth
of the condemnor.93 Most courts have taken their lead from the United
States Supreme Court and simply assumed that if private economic
development will result from the private taking, this economic end
use satisfies the public use requirement.94 Private economic development seems to be an acceptable end use and public purpose if the
private taking also yields land reform,95 economic growth,96 or natural resources development.97
But meaningful judicial review will not occur until courts have the
ability to review a record that reveals whether competing environmental or preservationist interests might, or should, be preferred to
standard, traditional interests involving economic growth or development. As noted above in Part III.C, land uses for recreation, tourism, and even nonuse preservationist purposes are increasingly
becoming more important than shopping malls and gas pipelines to
local communities.98 Courts should be able to hear evidence about,
and to decide, whether private takings for natural resource development or TS&D energy systems are as conducive to achieving a public
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See James and Gray, supra note 90; Denbury, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Klass, supra note 5, at 655–66.
See Laitos & Carr, supra note 67; Laitos, supra note 69.
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use as some recreational or nonuse purpose. Even a private taking
that protects natural capital or ecosystem services should be able to
be considered by reviewing courts to be a countervailing acceptable
(and perhaps preferred) public use of private land.99
C. Making Compensation More Just
When there is a private taking, there is little the landowner can
do other than to argue that the taking is for a private use or that the
compensation is unjust. Reviewing courts either presume that a
private energy or natural resources-related taking is a public use
because of the economic benefit accruing to the public or uphold statutory declarations that takings by TS&D common carriers are an
acceptable categorical taking. Therefore, the only real battle to be
waged involves how much the landowner will receive in compensation
for the private taking.
Commentators, and landowners, increasingly argue that current
compensation valuation methodologies for private taking fail to fully
compensate unwilling landowners and are therefore unjust.100 Scholars have suggested various reforms. If fair market value continues
as the standard, then rural landowners should be able to use comparable sales of easements and other property interests to define this
value.101 The idea of fair market value should perhaps also include
the worth of the use to which the private condemnor is planning to
put the property.102 Such a “project influence rule” would permit the
value of the extracted natural resource, or TS&D facility, to influence
the value of the landowner’s property.103
Other commentators have suggested that the value for just compensation, to be just, should attempt to capture the landowner’s subjective values for the land, which otherwise remain private.104 Each
99. See generally DIETER HELM, NATURAL CAPITAL: VALUING THE PLANET (2015); J.B. RUHL,
STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).
100. Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation”, 21 STAN . L.
REV. 693, 714 (1969); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?,
42 CATH . U. L. REV. 721 (1993); Lee, supra note 76.
101. Klass, supra note 5, at 683.
102. Williams, supra note 80, at 192.
103. Most states disallow use of the project influence rule. See State Dept. of Health v. The
Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1003 (Colo. 1994); ALA. CODE § 18-1A-173(a). Micheli & Smith, supra
note 11, at 18–19.
104. Gerstle, supra note 16, at 550.
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landowner whose property is about to be taken by a private party
holds a subjective land valuation for the land, which is unique to that
landowner. To assess this valuation, the just compensation calculation should consider how the affected landowner may perceive the
property differently than a hypothetical seller. Relevant inquiries
would involve ascertaining the factors that are subjective—duration
of land occupancy, nature of use by that landowner, future plans for
the land by that landowner, method by which the landowner came
to own the property (for example, by inheritance).105
Another model for just compensation largely abandons the fair
market value standard because it tends to undercompensate landowners whose property is being condemned against their will106 and
instead embraces a system which better compensates landowners
by (1) permitting them to share in the value their land contributes
to the eventual end use, (2) approximating the benefits of in-kind
redress, and (3) accounting for landowners’ lost opportunities regarding their condemned land.107 Two related just compensation calculations that accomplish these three goals are a “revenue-based
approach”108 and a “rental formula.”109
A revenue-based payment for private takings would ensure that
the just compensation valuation would not undervalue the actual
cost of the taking, which tends to subsidize private development and
over-incentivize such takings by private companies.110 Revenue-based
payments also provide more efficient use of land by fixing a price for
the taking of the land that will affect the private demand for the
taking.111 Similarly, a rental formula reflects the fact that most private takings for natural resource development or TS&D facilities will
generate a private profit for the private condemnor.112 The measure
of damages should therefore be a measurement of periodic rent. A
105. Nadler & Seidman, supra note 82, at 713.
106. Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political Philosophies
Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 292 (2006).
107. MICELI, supra note 78, at 71; Williams, supra note 80, at 184; id. at 292.
108. Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 77.
109. David A. Domina, Eminent Domain & For-Profit Energy Companies: Avoiding Unrest
with Landowners, THE NEBRASKA LAWYER 19 (Jan/Feb. 2015).
110. Miceli, supra note 78, at 69, 71.
111. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999); Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 99.
112. Domina, supra note 109, at 20.
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rental formula may thereby leave the property owner “subjectively
indifferent to the taking.”113
Consider the case of a private power company’s transmission line,
or a private gas company’s pipeline, that needs to stretch across rural
countryside that is privately owned farmland. Both of these private
parties (two TS&D entities) wish to exercise eminent domain across
private farms for the transmission lines or pipeline. Since the electricity and gas will surely be perceived as an eventual public use, the
only question for the farmers is the measure of just compensation due
for the private taking. If the private condemnor is taking an easement
across private property, this private taking will interfere with yearly
agricultural use. The appropriate calculation of damages, which is an
alternative measure to fair market value, could be either a revenuebased compensation114 or a rental calculation.115 Either method seems
more “just” than a simple fair market value calculation.

113. Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
239, 259 (2007).
114. Revenue-based payments approximate the landowners’ lost opportunity costs.
Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 103.
115. Rental payments allow a jury to set, as compensation, annual rent payments for the
use of the property. Domina, supra note 109, at 21.

